JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Using qualitative data from a large, successful private sector corporation (The Body Shop International), which was managed and staffed by an unusually high proportion of women, this paper questions whether norms of impersonality need be a defining characteristic of large organizations. We also ask whether displays of emotions in organizations need to be managed primarily for instrumental purposes, a form of emotional labor that entails costs for employees. This paper explores the viability of an alternative emotion management approach, "bounded emotionality," which encourages the constrained expression of emotions at work in order to encourage community building and personal well-being in the workplace. We show how bounded emotionality was enacted and explore difficulties in its implementation, including pressures on employees who prefer impersonality and the dangers of a deeper and more intimate form of controlling employees. Results show that rapid firm growth, a limited labor market, and the pressures of a competitive marketplace serve as boundary conditions for the maintenance of bounded emotionality.' People constantly experience emotions, yet in organizational theory, as in organizational life, the exploration of emotions has been largely deemphasized, marginalized, or ignored. Impersonal criteria for making decisions and restraints on emotional expression at work have long been the hallmarks of bureaucracy (e.g., Weber, 1946Weber, , 1981. Recent work has broken this emotional taboo, exploring how certain organizations require the expression of particular emotions at work to maximize organizational productivity, an aspect of job performance that has been labeled emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983). Van Maanen and Kunda (1989) and Turner (1986) have described the displays of enthusiasm and loyalty required in some corporate cultures. Hochschild (1983) and Sutton and his colleagues (e.g., Sutton and Rafaeli, 1988; Sutton, 1991) have explored discrepancies between outward behavior and inward feelings experienced by smiling flight attendants and nasty bill collectors. In contrast, feminist organizational theorists have taken a focus on emotions one step closer to a kind of personal authenticity, arguing that expression of a wider range of emotions at work (labeled bounded emotionality) is desirable, not to enhance productivity but to foster the psychological well-being of organizational members and their families (Mumby and Putnam, 1992; Putnam and Mumby, 1993; Meyerson, 1998). This paper explores this last, feminist approach to emotional expression in organizations. While these ideas have emerged from the study of small, usually nonprofit organizations, we examine whether bounded emotionality is feasible in the large, for-profit firms that dominate contemporary industrialized societies. We also ask if bounded emotionality in these contexts is desirable, from employees' points of view, or if it is yet another, more intimate and powerful form of organizational control. More generally, as the bureaucratic form proliferates across the industrialized landscape (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), these organizations seek to enhance their efficiency and chances for survival through such mechanisms as hierarchy, division of labor, and impersonal, appar-429/Administrative Science Quarterly, 43 (1998): 429-469 ently unemotional, and deindividualized "rule by rules" (Weber, 1946(Weber, , 1981 Ritzer, 1996). This paper focuses on one of these mechanisms, the management of emotion, and asks whether it is possible for a large organization, struggling to profit and grow in a highly competitive marketplace, to find new ways of incorporating emotional expression into organizational life. In the domain of emotions, is the isomorphism of bureaucracy an iron cage, or is it possible to find ways ofdoing business differently, on a large scale?
Using qualitative data from a large, successful private sector corporation (The Body Shop International), which was managed and staffed by an unusually high proportion of women, this paper questions whether norms of impersonality need be a defining characteristic of large organizations. We also ask whether displays of emotions in organizations need to be managed primarily for instrumental purposes, a form of emotional labor that entails costs for employees. This paper explores the viability of an alternative emotion management approach, "bounded emotionality," which encourages the constrained expression of emotions at work in order to encourage community building and personal well-being in the workplace. We show how bounded emotionality was enacted and explore difficulties in its implementation, including pressures on employees who prefer impersonality and the dangers of a deeper and more intimate form of controlling employees. Results show that rapid firm growth, a limited labor market, and the pressures of a competitive marketplace serve as boundary conditions for the maintenance of bounded emotionality.' People constantly experience emotions, yet in organizational theory, as in organizational life, the exploration of emotions has been largely deemphasized, marginalized, or ignored. Impersonal criteria for making decisions and restraints on emotional expression at work have long been the hallmarks of bureaucracy (e.g., Weber, 1946 Weber, , 1981 . Recent work has broken this emotional taboo, exploring how certain organizations require the expression of particular emotions at work to maximize organizational productivity, an aspect of job performance that has been labeled emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983) . Van Maanen and Kunda (1989) and Turner (1986) have described the displays of enthusiasm and loyalty required in some corporate cultures. Hochschild (1983) and Sutton and his colleagues (e.g., Sutton and Rafaeli, 1988; Sutton, 1991) have explored discrepancies between outward behavior and inward feelings experienced by smiling flight attendants and nasty bill collectors. In contrast, feminist organizational theorists have taken a focus on emotions one step closer to a kind of personal authenticity, arguing that expression of a wider range of emotions at work (labeled bounded emotionality) is desirable, not to enhance productivity but to foster the psychological well-being of organizational members and their families (Mumby and Putnam, 1992; Putnam and Mumby, 1993; Meyerson, 1998). This paper explores this last, feminist approach to emotional expression in organizations. While these ideas have emerged from the study of small, usually nonprofit organizations, we examine whether bounded emotionality is feasible in the large, for-profit firms that dominate contemporary industrialized societies. We also ask if bounded emotionality in these contexts is desirable, from employees' points of view, or if it is yet another, more intimate and powerful form of organizational control. More generally, as the bureaucratic form proliferates across the industrialized landscape (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), these organizations seek to enhance their efficiency and chances for survival through such mechanisms as hierarchy, division of labor, and impersonal, appar-ently unemotional, and deindividualized "rule by rules" (Weber, 1946 (Weber, , 1981 Ritzer, 1996) . This paper focuses on one of these mechanisms, the management of emotion, and asks whether it is possible for a large organization, struggling to profit and grow in a highly competitive marketplace, to find new ways of incorporating emotional expression into organizational life. In the domain of emotions, is the isomorphism of bureaucracy an iron cage, or is it possible to find ways ofdoing business differently, on a large scale?
CONTROL IN THREE IDEAL TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS
The process of organizing requires the coordination of employees' behavior. Because coordination may be imperfect (e.g., because of miscommunication or conflicts of interest), organizational members engage in various control strategies. Perrow (1986: 129-131) distinguished three types of control: (1) direct and fully obtrusive, such as giving orders, surveillance, and rules; (2) bureaucratic and somewhat less obtrusive, such as division of labor and hierarchy; and (3) fully unobtrusive control of the cognitive premises underlying action, in which the employee voluntarily restricts the range of behaviors considered appropriate. We draw on and extend this conceptualization of control to distinguish three ideal types of organizations: traditional bureaucratic, normative, and feminist. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of each of these ideal types. As ideal types, these categories are theory-derived; actual organizations, including the organization studied in this paper, The Body Shop International, are expected to exhibit a mix of these characteristics.
The traditional bureaucracy described in table 1 is derived from a Weberian model, combining Perrow's first two, relatively obtrusive forms of control, direct and bureaucratic (e.g., Barnard, 1938; Rushing, 1966; Hall, 1968; Ouchi, 1977; Weed, 1993; Adler and Borys, 1996) . Contrary to Weber's ideal type formulation, the expression of certain emotions (e.g., anger and competitiveness), is often condoned in traditional bureaucracies. The second, normative type of organization is characterized by Perrow's third, unobtrusive form of control, in which management has shifted limited powers to lower-level employees through such strategies as participative management, team-based production, less specialized division of labor, job rotation, consensual decision making, and an emphasis on cooperation (e.g., Tompkins and Cheney, 1985; Soeters, 1986;-Bartunek and Moch, 1991; Eccles and Nohria, 1992; Barker and Tompkins, 1994). Normative organizations rely less on control by formal authorities and more on the internalization of values; control is achieved by employees' self-policing. Members actively take up management's or a group's decision premises and make them their own, seeing their own goals and those of the organization as coinciding (e.g., Ouchi, 1980; Perrow, 1986; Cheney and Tompkins, 1987). As table 1 shows, normative strategies preserve, in a modified fashion, many of the major dimensions of traditional bureaucracies. For example, the verticality of a hierarchy is somewhat flattened, while preserving many of the prerogatives of management's formal authority, and the division of labor between lower-level employees and top management is largely preserved, while at 430/ASQ, June 1998 Bounded Emotionality What we have learned about bounded emotionality comes from a limited set of small, often nonprofit organizations. We don't know if it is possible to enact bounded emotionality in one of the large, for-profit organizations that dominate so much of industrialized society. The efficiency and financial pressures of the competitive marketplace, compounded by the pressures toward growth, particularly when a company is publicly owned, would work against the time-consuming, noninstrumental orientation of bounded emotionality. Feminist theory advocates explorations of the intersections of public (work) and private (home) concerns (e.g., Hochschild, 1989), yet because of the pressures of a competitive marketplace, there is always the danger that performance concerns will take precedence over other priorities. Given these tensions, bounded emotionality may be difficult to enact in a large, for-profit organization, creating pressures toward reversion to more familiar forms of emotion management in orga-nizations: impersonality or emotional labor, reinforced by traditional bureaucratic or normative control mechanisms. Bounded emotionality would have a better chance of surviving in such a context if facilitating factors were present. Two such factors are the proportion of women in various parts of the organization's hierarchy and the organization's ideology. First, from a positional version of feminism, if more women than men have been socialized to prefer expressing the kinds of emotions and engaging in the kinds of self-disclosure on which bounded emotionality is based, this form of emotional management might be more likely to flourish in an organization that employed a relatively large proportion of women, provided that some of those women held high-level management positions and were willing to influence the development of these kinds of emotional norms. Second, the enactment of bounded emotionality might have a greater chance of success in an organization that has an ideology congruent with some of the fundamental elements of bounded emotionality. Although it is doubtful any organization has deliberately incorporated bounded emotionality into its strategy and goals, an organization might endorse goals or values congruent with some of its attributes. These are the factors we explored in our study of The Body Shop.
METHOD The Organization and Its Employees
As part of a larger project, we studied a large, for-profit organization that had an unusual prevalence of women employees in the managerial ranks and endorsed an ideology that supports a subset of the elements of bounded emotionality. The Body Shop International, a publicly owned multinational firm in the cosmetics industry, is known for its commitment to using naturally based products, protecting the environment, and promoting various social and political causes. This paper is based on data collected between December 1992 and November 1993; during this interval The Body Shop employed over 6,000 people internationally. At that time there were just under 1,000 retail outlets in 42 countries, with new stores, both franchised and company-owned, opening every two to three days. Between March 1, 1990 and February 28, 1992, total revenues had risen from ?208.1 million to ?265.4 million (Body Shop memo dated 9/16/92). This, then, is a large and successful private sector organization. Recent growth had been so rapid that current structures, job definitions, employee statistics, and even records of names and telephone numbers were unavailable or seriously out of date. Because rapid change both preceded and extended beyond the period of investigation, this study is an in-depth snapshot of a particular period in the company's life cycle, rather than a longitudinal study. The Body Shop had recently been split into five separate "companies," with considerable decentralization of policies and control, to counteract perceptions that the company was becoming too large, impersonal, and bureaucratic. The five companies were: The Body Shop International (BSI), which oversaw much of the headquarters work as well as the international shops; Body Shop U.K. (BSUK), which was responsible for the retail shops in the U.K. and internal communica-439/ASQ, June 1998 tions (such as weekly videos, public relations); Supply Company, which handled both production and distribution; Colourings, which designed and marketed makeup products; and CosTec, which manufactured the makeup line. We studied parts of all five sectors, in the U.S. and England. Table 2 gives a breakdown of the characteristics of the employees observed and interviewed, as well as the variety of methods used to study the various parts of the company. Most of our data collection time was spent in observation, participantobservation, and informal conversations. Duration of observations ranged from two hours to several weeks (periodically), with greater time spent in observations of and informal conversations with nonmanagerial employees; particularly on shopfloors. As described in more detail in table 3, we conducted in-depth structured interviews with 57 employees, representing all five parts of the firm, including most levels of management; 16 (28 percent) of these interviewees held nonmanagerial positions. Because most of our interactions with nonmanagerial employees involved observation and informal conversations, we have more confidence in our understanding of nonmanagerial perspectives than these structured interview numbers would suggest, but we also have less in-depth material from these levels of The Body Shop than we would like.
Although a detailed description of The Body Shop's formal structure and administrative policies is beyond the scope of this paper, some background will prove useful. Each of the five companies, at the time of the study, had its own board of directors, management structure, and personnel policies. The formal structure of each of the five units seemed, on the surface, to be traditionally bureaucratic, with superiorsubordinate relationships, division of labor, and a few unitspecific standardized rules and procedures, most notably group interviews of job applicants, some form of perfor- given by a company regional trainer. The second was a twoday training workshop on merchandising for nine shop managers and assistant managers at the firm's training center in London. During both courses, the researcher took part in all role-playing exercises, product experimentation and application, written and verbal exercises, lectures, and group exercises. Unlike the U.K. managers, she did not take the merchandising exam for certification. In the third context, the researcher spent one afternoon working in production, filling bottles of Fuzzy Peach Bath Gel. This opportunity allowed her to gain firsthand knowledge of working conditions while observing coworkers' interactions and worker-supervisor relations on the filling line. 4. On-site structured interviews. In both the U.K. and the U.S., we prepared a list of people/job titles whom we wished to interview. We asked to meet employees from a wide range of areas of the company, requesting both highranking managers and nonmanagerial employees in each area. No requests were denied, to our knowledge, except by employees who were out of town or, in the case of one regional office, undergoing reorganization. In a few cases a somewhat streamlined interview had to be conducted, due to time pressures. Many interviews concluded with a suggestion that we meet with someone else, which we did whenever possible. As our study proceeded, some employees not on our schedule asked to talk with us, and again we complied whenever possible, in effect using a snowball selection procedure. Some employees were interviewed by two investigators simultaneously; most were interviewed by one or the other, allowing a larger sample. Prior to each interview, we assured study participants (other than Ms. and Mr. Roddick) that we would use pseudonyms, avoid specific job titles, use generic labels for departments, disguise or delete identifying details, and otherwise protect them, to the best of our ability, from being identifiable in any quotation. We have kept all those promises in the writing of this paper, when quoting informants. 
.). Under such conditions, face-to-face
interactions among all or even many employees were impossible and knowledge of the subjectivities of others was scarce, as so many of the others were now strangers. The lack of interpersonal closeness due to the company's growth made it more difficult to follow through on commitment to the company's espoused values of caring and nurturance, creating instead conditions that fostered impersonality. Time and financial pressures, caused in part by growth, began to erode many of the company's social rituals, which had provided occasions for building and enjoying a sense of community within the company. These events were important to the employees not only for their symbolic value but also as a way to renew connections with other employees not seen on a daily basis, as can be seen in the following discussion at a values meeting in the U.K. headquarters: "It's a shame that company day was canceled due to money, but if directors want to be close to average workers, they shouldn't cancel these things."
"First thing we're knocked on the head when there are cuts." "There's a rumor that the Xmas party will be canceled; it's bad for morale." "Are social events important to our company?" "They would be better if people mixed up and do not stay with their own group." "We tried it both ways; staying with people you know is best. People change places anyway." "Can I be mouthy again? Again on the friendliness issue. By doing it [socializing] by department we stay separate." "It's easier to manage that way."
Although it is an achievement to enact the goal of bounded emotionality, even partially, in a large, for-profit organization, it is clear that The Body Shop's rapid growth placed strains on its ability to do so.
Limitations of the labor market. These problems were exacerbated by the influx of new hires. Growth created a 452/ASQ, June 1998
Bounded Emotionality need to expand the managerial staff at the headquarters in Littlehampton, on the coast of southern England. There was a shortage of qualified candidates with the requisite managerial-level retailing experience who lived within commuting distance. Experienced female managers were said to be especially hard to find. And, given that employment at The Body Shop entailed showing evidence of prior deep commitment to the company's political, community, and environmental agendas, the local labor market had been exhausted. Some of the new hires, especially at the managerial level, were criticized as lacking some of the political commitments, gender sensitivity, and emotional management skills of the "Fold guard" employees. When some employees complained about a growing lack of community at The Body Shop, they attributed it not to a lack of time or to the pressure of work to be done, nor to growth per se but, rather, to the influx of high-ranking men hired from more traditional retailing organizations: were really committed to The Body Shop values, he would not accept a job anywhere without investigating the company's policies in these key areas. But Morris knew that his friend was too emotionally reserved to reveal that he would accept the other job because he needed money badly to support his wife and child. The child had a severe disability and needed constant, expensive care. Weber's emphasis on unemotional impersonality in bureaucracies is premised on a deindividualized "rule by rules." In the case of the rejected job applicant, his apparently unemotional preference for impersonality was caused by intense emotions about his son and his desire to keep these feelings private. The panelists, in contrast, chose to apply their deindividualized rules regarding the paramount importance of any applicant's political commitments, so that self-disclosure about this intimate problem became an essential prerequisite for Morris's friend becoming a Body Shop employee. Morris's friend's silence was congruent with his individual emotional limitations, but he was not hired. Emotional diversity entails a contradiction for bounded emotionality. If compliance pressures are used to support bounded emotionality, by sanctioning or excluding those uncomfortable with its tenets, this process contradicts bounded emotionality by requiring acts of intolerance that fail to recognize as legitimate the emotional preferences of people with differing subjectivities and values. degrees. The men aren't prepared for the changes their wives go through after working for us. Whether caused by overwork or a discrepancy between an exciting, empowering work environment and a more mundane, less empowered home life, both male and female employees of The Body Shop sometimes reported considerable emotional and physical work stress. Although The Body Shop emphasized integrating emotional concerns into the working environment, in ways that were unusual and went beyond the usual "act nice" or "act tough" demands of instrumental emotional display, their version of bounded emotionality provided little protection from the experience of aversive emotional stress on the job.
Loss of Bounded Emotionality: Work Feelings Become Norms
So far, this description has presented The Body Shop's approach to emotionality at work in unitary terms, but we also found some variation across different parts of the company. For example, a marketing division (a pseudonym) had evolved a distinctive approach to managing emotion. This division had been geographically and structurally separate for some time and was managed and staffed almost exclusively by women. Although it was not clear whether this division's distinctive approach to emotion had its origins in geographical and structural isolation or the preferences of its employees, at the time our study was conducted, all levels of employees at the division articulated and enforced compliance with a clearly defined set of emotional norms that offered a complex mixture of some elements of bounded emotionality and a preponderance of emotional labor.
Defining the norms. In this section we rely heavily on quotations from Moira, an upper-level manager, because she was exceptionally articulate regarding the marketing division's emotional norms and especially active in reinforcing them. When asked about her management style, Moira said she tried to keep a balance, illustrating that balance by drawing a continuum. She labeled the left end of the continuum "insensitive" and wrote under it: "Management is all about getting a task done." She labeled the other end of the continuum "hypersensitive" and described it as "Out of balance. Highly strung. Like when a person feels it is easier to write a memo than discuss a problem face to face." Moira then labeled the center of the continuum "sensitive." She said, "We talk about it openly. We need to be sensitive to each other's moods." This statement retains bounded emotionality's sensitivity to intersubjective limitations, but quotations below suggest that spontaneous emergence of context-specific, personally authentic work feelings were not encouraged. Instead, emotional "face work" was required.
Employees were encouraged to express particular emotions and suppress others in all work contexts, no matter how they were privately feeling. These expectations were explicitly articulated and repeatedly communicated, using feedback and catchy slogans, so they would be internalized by division employees. As Moira told us: You don't just get it automatically. He left in two weeks." Division employees were judged by the extent to which they engaged in specified emotional displays. Some of these displays were congruent with bounded emotionality, for example, an off-again, on-again emphasis on intersubjective sensitivity and a strong sense of community. Other elements of bounded emotionality, particularly the spontaneous expression of personally authentic work feelings and a respect for a heterarchy of values (as illustrated by treatment of emotional nonconformists), were enacted inconsistently and rarely in this division. This, then, was a division in which traditional bureaucratic (e.g., firing) and normative mechanisms of control (e.g., negative feedback about inappropriate emotional behavior) were freely used to ensure compliance with clearly defined emotional norms. Although the patterns of behavior found in the marketing division could be found elsewhere in The Body Shop, these patterns were more firmly codified and compliance more strictly enforced by superiors in the marketing division, making the distinctiveness of this division a question of degree. In this division, forced compliance with emotional norms eroded a subset of the components of bounded emotionality and began to take on more of the overtones of emotional labor in contexts in which the two approaches to emotional expression were in conflict.
CONCLUSION Enacting Bounded Emotionality
We found considerable evidence of the enactment of bounded emotionality. To the extent that The Body Shop did not provide a perfect working environment, it was, in the eyes of most of the employees we studied, better than the available alternatives, where the same conflicts of interest between employee and employer might surface, often in a more alienating or exploitative form. In accord with a pro-bounded emotionality position, when conflicts between individual and organizational interests did occur, the emotional and physical needs of employees were often given priority, as when stressed employees were given paid leave or tasks were left incomplete to spare an employee emotional turmoil. Those advocating the anti-bounded-emotionality position would note that when organizational commitments to profit making conflicted with individual interests or other organizational interests that had been democratically chosen by employees, work often took precedence over personal concerns. For example, tour guides experienced physical as well as emotional work stress (their necks and feet ached), and some shop staff worked such long hours that their physical needs for sleep and relaxation and their emotional needs for family life were not met. When work encroached on family and personal time, The Body Shop did not seek to reduce chronic long hours; instead, it provided formal mechanisms to alleviate the resulting stress, including private counseling and childcare, in effect blaming the individual's coping abilities for problems caused by the organization (Meyerson, 1994) . From this perspective, bounded emotionality can be interpreted as emotional exploitation. There is no conclusive empirical means of disconfirming or supporting one of these interpretations at the expense of the other. As the authors of this paper, we differ in our opinions. One of us worries that while most people at The Body Shop sincerely believed in the company's espoused values, the rhetoric may have been stronger than the implementation. According to this coauthor, sometimes the leftist politi-cal, environmental, and humanitarian rhetoric (such as stated commitments to elements of bounded emotionality) seemed to be used primarily to sell cosmetics for a profit, living up to promises only when such promises did not conflict with commercial objectives. From this perspective, the physical and emotional signs of employee stress, outlined above, are convincing evidence of a lack of good faith. The other two coauthors of this paper take these signs of stress very seriously and see them as an area meriting serious ameliorative action but nevertheless believe that this company was trying hard to enact its ideals, including bounded emotionality. These two coauthors found The Body Shop to be like Ivory soap-certainly not perfect, but "98 percent pure." Although our estimates of the purity of the company's motives varied, all three of us thought the company deserved credit for its efforts to do business differently within the constraints of a highly competitive industry. In contrast to most large, forprofit organizations, The Body Shop was attempting to move, and to a substantial extent succeeded, toward a form of bounded emotionality, one that, perhaps inevitably, coexisted with conventional forms of emotional labor. Obstacles to Implementing Bounded Emotionality Several factors threatened The Body Shop's ability to continue implementing bounded emotionality. The organization's increased size had detrimental effects because it increased both the amount of work and the number of employees who did not know each other or each other's job responsibilities. The company's growth also made it more difficult to hire and retain a demographically and ideologically homogeneous group of employees from the local labor market. Many job applicants with the requisite retailing experience came from more traditional organizations, lacked an intense commitment to The Body Shop's political agenda, and were uncomfortable with the emotional expressiveness required by bounded emotionality. In addition, most of these job applicants were men, making it more difficult to maintain the company's commitment to providing opportunities for managerial positions to women. Further, many of The Body Shop's long-term employees, who had been hired when they were young and single, were now married and anticipating caring for children or aging parents. The goals and attributes of an aging workforce didn't mesh easily with the company's predilection for extremely long working hours and high-pressure performance. Many of the long-term employees were women, a fact that exacerbated these anticipated difficulties, because so much of the dependent care within the family would be done by women. Such difficulties were intensified by the fact that The Body Shop was subject to the pressures of a highly competitive marketplace. The Body Shop's financial success and public stock offering created demands for rapid growth, and that growth exacerbated the effects of local labor market limitations. The Body Shop was in danger of losing its distinctiveness and becoming imprisoned, with so many other formerly innovative organizations, in the iron cage of bureaucracy, with its traditional and normative emphases on impersonality and emotional labor. Despite the obstacles, however, the company had so far managed to maintain two distinguishing features that may 463/ASQ, June 1998 5 Unlike other varieties of feminist theory, socialist-feminist and feminist-socialist scholars (the order of the adjectives reflects the primacy given to class or gender concerns) work from Marxist roots and draw extensively on critical theory (Jaggar, 1983).
have facilitated the continued implementation of bounded emotionality: a relatively high proportion of women employees, some with high-level managerial positions, and a relatively strong ideological commitment to finding ways of doing business differently. The presence of one or both of these factors may be key to resisting bureaucratic isomorphism, at least in the domain of bounded emotionality. In large for-profit organizations would the presence of a high proportion of women, with a significant minority at the highest ranks, be enough to sustain bounded emotionality? Or would ideology alone suffice, perhaps in the firms that have joined the Social Venture Network, a network of organizations with ideologies similar in some ways to that of The Body Shop? Or, because so many women do not seek to do business differently, must both factors be present? If studies addressing questions such as these could show that bureaucratic isomorphism is less pervasive than we thought, or need not be as pervasive as it is, they would make an important contribution to organizational theory and practice.
Intersections of Feminist and Critical Theories
Feminist theory is a form of critical theory in that it shares a commitment to radical change that would dramatically improve the well-being of ("emancipate") people in disadvantaged positions. To an unfortunate and unnecessary extent, however, feminist theory and critical theory have tended to develop separately, often not drawing on each other's ideas when intersections of concern have occurred. There are, of course, important differences between these theoretical traditions. For example, feminist scholars focus primarily on sex and gender as sources of disadvantage, while Marxist versions of critical theory tend to emphasize class, particularly the concerns of male blue-collar workers.5 This paper is an attempt to explore an intersection between these two traditions of inquiry, drawing on their similarities and differences and, we hope, contributing to both. Feminist and critical scholars in organizational studies have focused on critiques of business operations-most in large for-profit corporations; exploration of viable alternative forms has been largely restricted to small (often nonprofit) organizations. In part, these limitations have occurred because organizational studies is an empirically based social science and, as such, is inherently conservative in its focus on how things have been done, rather than on how things could be done. In such a context, it is particularly important for feminist and critical scholars to study outlier organizations that are struggling to escape the iron cage of conventional bureaucratic practices, on a large scale, in a for-profit environment. Outlier organizations expose the limits of the possible in the contemporary, industrialized economy. This study focused on such an outlier-a large, for-profit firm that had successfully implemented at least one feminist practice, bounded emotionality. The practice was enthusiastically received by many employees, who saw advantages (personal authenticity, greater exploration of home/work influences, commitment) that feminist organizational theorists had predicted. Critical theory helped us be critical, refraining the practice as a form of normative control, revealing disadvantages (conformity pressures, difficulties experienced by dis-senters, discomfort), as well as the possibilities of exploitation and bad-faith use of leftist corporate rhetoric. This paper, then, illustrates what can be learned from drawing on both theoretical traditions simultaneously in a study of an organization struggling to be different. To restate what can be learned in more general terms, many of the disadvantaged are women, yet critical theorists often do not explore needs and interests unique to women. In addition, feminist theory might offer a useful counterbalance to critical theory's critical emphasis by suggesting a set of organizational innovations (such as altered time management practices and emotional management strategies) that might be beneficial to many women and, perhaps, many men. Even if such innovations were primarily helpful to one sex, they would still be worthwhile to study. To the extent that conflicts of interest between the sexes do exist, critical theories with Marxist roots are well situated to offer insights. Thus, only by assessing both the positive and negative impacts of changes, from the viewpoints of both men and women, can feminist and critical theorists jointly hope to contribute to radical change that emancipates both sexes, not just one.
